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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Thomas Peterson appeals from three cases which were presided over by two
different district court judges.

However, all three cases are interrelated, as each

subsequent charge also constitutes a probation violation of the preceding case(s). With
the final charge, all three sentences were executed.

Mr. Peterson asserts that the

district court, which revoked his probation in the first two cases, abused its discretion by
revoking that probation, or alternatively, by not reducing his sentences sua sponte when
it did so.

He also asserts that it abused its discretion by denying his subsequent

motions for reconsideration pursuant to I.C.R. 35 (hereinafter, Rule 35) in those cases.
IVlr. Peterson also asserts that, in the newest case, the district court abused its
discretion by denying his Rule 35 motion in that case.
Most importantly, however, is the fact that the district courts appear to have
misplaced part of the records they considered: the telephone records which formed the
evidentiary basis upon which the newest charge was based. The district court in the
newest case expressly considered that evidence, which it asserted was attached to the
PSI. The other district court stated that it considered all the information attached to the
PSI prepared for the district court in the newest case. The fact that the whereabouts of
those documents is currently unknown, which has resulted in the inability to include
them in the appellate record, constitutes a violation of Mr. Peterson's state and federal
constitutional due process rights.
This Court should remedy those abuses.

1

Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
There are three cases at issue in this appeal. 1 Mr. Peterson is currently serving
time on three sentences, each for a violation of a No Contact Order (hereinafter, NCO).
(R., Vol.1, pp.316-18; R., Vol.2, pp.55-57.) 2

Specifically, those sentences are a

five-year unified sentence, with three years fixed (R., Vol.1, pp.60-62); a concurrent
unified five-year sentence, with three and one-half years fixed. (R., Vol.1, p.259-64);
and a consecutive unified sentence of five years, with one and one-half years fixed.
(R., Vol.2, pp.56.)
Mr.

Peterson

has

been

diagnosed

with

post-traumatic

stress

disorder

(hereinafter, PTSD), as well as a cognitive memory disorder secondary to a brain

1

Docket Number 39146 (CR-08-17740) and Docket Number 39147 (CR-10-10642)
were consolidated by Supreme Court order on November 22, 2011.
On February 10, 2012, Mr. Peterson filed a notice of appeal in CR-11-3748
challenging the sentence imposed in that case. (R., Vol.2, pp.65-67.) The resulting
appeal, Docket Number 39679, was dismissed by the Supreme Court as untimely. He
filed another Notice of Appeal in CR-11-3748 on March 9, 2012, challenging the district
court's denial of his subsequently-filed motion for leniency pursuant to I.C.R. 35
(hereinafter, Rule 35). (R., Vol.2, pp.74-76.) That appeal is addressed in Docket
Number 39783. As the independent charge in that case was also alleged as a probation
violation in Docket Numbers 39146 and 39147, the issues to be presented were
significantly similar, and therefore, the Idaho Supreme Court ordered all three cases
consolidated on July 11, 2012.
Therefore, Mr. Peterson has filed a contemporaneous motion requesting that this
Court take judicial notice of the record from Supreme Court Docket Number 39679
pursuant to I.AR. 32(c) and I.R.E. 201. The documents therein are relevant to
understanding the procedural history of Mr. Peterson's case and the facts therein are
capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy
cannot be reasonably questioned - the records maintained by the Idaho Supreme
Court.
2
There are two independently-paginated volumes containing the clerk's records. For
purposes of clarity, "R., Vol. 1" will refer to the record prepared for Docket Numbers
39146 and 39147. "R., Vol.2" will refer to the record prepared for Docket Number
39783.
2

injury, 3 and anti-social personality disorder.

(See, e.g., Presentence Investigation

Report (hereinafter, PSI), Vol. 1, pp.339, 448-57 (letter and report from Dr. Jason Gage
confirming those diagnoses).) 4

He has been found to be fully disabled as a result of

these conditions, making him eligible for social security and Medicaid funding.
(See, e.g., PSI, Vol.1, pp.344-49.) Even before these issues developed, Mr. Peterson's

life was not easy, as he was physically abused by a step-father (see, e.g., PSI, Vol.2,
p.446), and suffered from either Attention Deficit Disorder (hereinafter, ADD) or
Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (hereinafter, ADHD).

3

(See, e.g., PSI, Vol.2,

That injury, the product of a motorcycle accident in 2005, also affects Mr. Peterson
physically, as it has caused him to develop a seizure disorder. (See, e.g., PSI, Vol.1,
p.410; PSI, Vol.2, p.454.) In addition, the accident did severe damage to his leg,
leaving him in chronic pain and limited weight-bearing ability in that leg, which in turn,
limits his mobility. (See, e.g., PSI, Vol.2, p.162.) He had, however, healed sufficiently
for doctors to remove the hardware (such as the screws) which had been implanted
during his initial treatment. (See, e.g., PSI, Vol.2, pp.292-98 (Dr. Erik Heggland's report
of the procedure to remove the hardware).)
4
Both district courts received an updated PSI to advise them on their respective 2011
decisions. For purposes of clarity, the PSI prepared for prepared for Docket Nos. 39146
and 39147 will be referred to as "PSI, Vol.1," and page references herein will
correspond with the page numbers electronic PDF file "PetersonPSl.pdf" contained on
the CD-ROM bearing Docket Numbers 39146 and 39147. The PSI prepared for Docket
No. 39783 will be referred to as "PSI, Vol.2," and page references herein will
correspond with the page numbers of the electronic PDF file "PetersonPSl.pdf"
contained on the CD-ROM bearing Docket Number 39783.
The two PSls appear to contain much of the same information (which includes
various PSls, medical information and evaluations, police reports, etc.), although there
are some case-specific documents, such as the relevant charging Information
documents or relevant court minutes. (Compare, e.g., PSI, Vol.1, p.314 with PSI, Vol.2,
p.232-35.) This is consistent with the information in the record, which indicates that the
district court in Docket Numbers 39146 and 39147 used the PSI information prepared in
Docket Number 39783. (Tr., Vol.1, p.103, L.25 - p.104, L.4 ("I also have the
Department of Correction updates on the file and the updated presentence report
prepared for [Docket Number 39783] and the attached materials related to those
presentence materials").) However, the information appears to have been scanned into
the electronic file in a different order. PSI, Vol.1 also has two sections where two pages
from the hard copy of the PSI are contained on one digital page. Additionally, there are
also multiple copies of several documents in both PSls (for example, each contains at
least five copies of the police reports relating to the 3rd violation of the NCO (the
investigation which also addressed the vandalized vehicle)).
3

pp.132, 481.)

Regardless, he was able to earn his GED in 2001. (PSI, Vol.2, p. 533.)

Furthermore, he has been able to remain employed with the same company since 2008
despite his current disabilities, and he is eligible to return to work there upon his
eventual release. 5

(See, e.g., PSI, Vol.1, p.9.)

His employers submitted letters of

support to the district courts on Mr. Peterson's behalf. (See, e.g., PSI, Vol.2, pp.428-29,
534.)

In addition, he has ongoing support from other members of his community. 6

(See, e.g., PSI, Vol.2, pp.432, 481, 483.)

And, evidencing his progress while on

probation, he was able to maintain a clean and sober residence, to continue his
employment, and to attend treatment programs during that time. (PSI, Vol.1, p.72.)
The NCO appears to have arisen from Mr. Peterson's conviction of domestic
assault in 2007. (See PSI, Vol.1, p.405.) The "victim" of the NCO violation in these
cases, Dorene Giannini, had been trying to get the district court to lift a No Contact
Order (hereinafter, NCO) before any of these charges arose

(see, e.g. PSI, Vol.2,

p.23), as it prevented Mr. Peterson (her fiancee at that time) from having contact with
her.

(Tr., Vol.1, p.6, Ls.14-17, p.7, Ls.8-10.) 7 Mr. Peterson, a recovering alcoholic,

5

According to the Administrative Law Judge (hereinafter, ALJ) who resolved
Mr. Peterson's social security claim, this did not constitute "gainful employment"
because his employer was understanding of his condition, and as such, gave
Mr. Peterson a lot of leeway in the workplace. (See, e.g., PSI, Vol.1, p.347.)
6
He has also been able to reclaim his relationship with his daughter and is working to
do so with his son. (See, e.g., PSI, Vol.1, pp.8, 11.)
7
The transcripts for the hearings in the cases now on appeal are contained in five
independently-paginated volumes. For purposes of clarity, "Tr., Vol.1" will refer to the
volume containing the February 19, 2009, sentencing hearing, the August 19, 2010,
entry of guilty plea hearing, the September 30, 2010, sentencing hearing, and the
September 1, 2011, sentencing hearing. "Tr., Vol.2" will refer to the volume containing
the January 8, 2009, change of plea hearing. "Tr., Vol.3" will refer to the December 10,
2009, admit-deny and deposition hearing, which, on May 4, 2012, the Supreme Court
ordered to be augmented to the record. "Tr., Vol.4" will refer to the volume containing
the June 16, 2011, admit-deny hearing. And "Tr., Vol.5'' will refer to the volume
containing the May 20, 2011, plea hearing and the September 14, 2011 sentencing
hearing.
4

began experiencing a relapse and, recognizing the symptoms, called her for support
after being unable to reach his sponsorer. (Tr., Vol.1, p.13, L.11 - p.14, L.1, p.19, Ls.24.)

The telephonic contact was allowed pursuant to the NCO at that time.

R., Vol.1, pp.101-02.)
prevent a relapse,

(See,

However, in her effort to support Mr. Peterson and help him
Ms. Giannini took him to get some dinner and on some

errands. (Tr., Vol.2, Ls.18 - p.21, L.5.) As a result of that contact, the State charged
Mr. Peterson in Docket Number 39146 with violating the NCO, as well as giving false
information. (See, e.g., R., Vol.1, pp.36-37.) Mr. Peterson pied guilty to violating the
NCO and, in exchange, the State dismissed the false information charge. (Tr., Vol.2,
p.5, Ls.20-21.)

It also agreed to not file a persistent violator enhancement and to

recommend a five-year unified sentence, subject to a period of retained jurisdiction. 8
(Tr., Vol.2, p.5, L.22 - p.6, L.2.) The district court ultimately imposed a five-year unified
sentence, with three years fixed, and it retained jurisdiction.

(R., Vol.1, pp.60-62.)

Upon review of his successful performance in the rider program, the district court
suspended his sentence for a five-year period of probation.
Conditions 21

(R., Vol.1, pp.69-74.)

and 22 of that probation addressed the on-going restrictions of

Mr. Peterson's ability to contact Ms. Giannini. (R., Vol.1, p. 72.)
However, there was some confusion between Mr. Peterson and his probation
officer in regard to those conditions, which resulted in a motion for probation violation.
(R., Vol.1, pp.91-92.)

Mr. Peterson erroneously believed that when the underlying

NCOs had been lifted, 9 he was free to contact Ms. Giannini, but did not recognize

8

There record indicates that Mr. Peterson had violated this NCO two times prior to this
instance. (See PSI, Vol.1, p.405.)
9
One was quashed on March 18, 2009, by court order. (See, e.g., PSI, Vol.1, p.45.)
A second NCO regarding Ms. Giannini from a different case was quashed on March 19,
5

that his probation officer could still order him not to have contact with her if he saw fit
to do so. (Tr., Vol.3, p.1, L.23 - p.2, L.8.) Otherwise, Mr. Peterson had been doing well
on probation.

(Tr., Vol.3, p.1, Ls.15-17, p.2, L.19.)

Once the parties clarified the

misunderstanding, they agreed to offer a joint recommendation that Mr. Peterson be
reinstated on probation, but with a clear and formal NCO which forbade all contact but
telephonic contact between himself and Ms. Giannini until such time that he received
written permission from his probation officer to reinitiate contact, and that the existing
NCO be quashed. (See Tr., Vol.3, p.6, L.18 - p.7, L.23.) That NCO was entered by the
district court. (R., Vol.1, p.101; Tr., p.21, Ls.12-18.)
Both Mr. Peterson and Ms. Giannini subsequently moved to quash that new NCO
in February 2010. (R., Vol.1, pp.106-07.) Mr. Peterson's probation officer objected and
the district court ordered the NCO to continue until the probation officer was satisfied. 10
(R., Vol.1, pp.111-12.) Subsequently, new charges, alleging more violations of the NCO
were filed by the State in Docket Number 39147. 11

It also filed a new motion for

probation violation in Docket Number 39146 based on the same underlying events.
(R., Vol.1, pp.129-30, 241.) Specifically, Mr. Peterson was waiting near Ms. Giannini's
house, attempting to get the license plate number of the person he believed had begun
dealing methamphetamine to Ms. Giannini (and as a result, caused Mr. Peterson's
probation officer to continue to object to quashing the NCO), which he intended to

2009, by court order. (See, e.g., PSI, Vol.1, p.56.) The subsequent motion for
probation violation was filed on November 22, 2009. (R., Vol.1, pp.91-92.)
10
Mr. Peterson moved to quash the NCO a second time, but when the district court
reiterated its position in regard to the probation officer's approval, defense counsel
indicated that Mr. Peterson did not wish to pursue the issue further, although
Mr. Peterson was not present at that hearing. (R., Vol.1, pp.113-16.)
11
The State additionally filed an Information, Part II, in Docket Number 39147, which
alleged a new persistent violator enhancement. (R., pp.248-50.)
6

forward

to

the

authorities.

(See,

e.g.,

PSI,

Vol.2,

p.158.)

court subsequently granted a motion to consolidate those two cases.

The

district

(R., Vol.1,

pp.137, 252.)
Mr. Peterson agreed to plead guilty to the charges of violating the NCO, as well
as admit the accompanying probation violations, and in exchange, the State agreed to
not pursue the persistent violator enhancement and to limit its recommendation to a
unified term of five years, with one year fixed.

(Tr., Vol.1, p.29, L.14 - p.30, L.4.)

Mr. Peterson also informed the district court that he was under the care of Dr. Jason
Gage for his brain injury and seizure disorder, and that Dr. Gage had confirmed the
diagnoses of PTSD, cognitive disorder, and anti-social personality disorder. (Tr., Vol.1,
p.41, L.19 - p.42, L.3.) Both the prosecutor and defense counsel confirmed that, apart
from the issues with the NCO, Mr. Peterson had been performing to expectations on his
probation. 12 (Tr., Vol.1, p.54, Ls.15-17, p.55, Ls.22-23.)
At the sentencing and disposition hearing, Mr. Peterson informed the district
court that he had recently been determined to be fully disabled from employment and
was eligible for social security and Medicaid assistance due to his mental health
conditions. (Tr., Vol.1, p.60, L.18 - p.61, L.2.) The district court felt that this was a
positive development as it would give Mr. Peterson more consistent access to
necessary medications, which in turn, helped him to improve his performance on
probation. (Tr., Vol.1, p.76, Ls.1-4, p.92, Ls.9 - p.93, L.8.) In fact, it stated that, but for
those developments, it would have not continued Mr. Peterson on probation, but would
have ordered him to serve his sentence in prison.

(Tr., Vol.1, p.93, Ls.9-12.)

Accordingly, the district court continued the probationary period in Docket Number

7

39146 and suspended the sentence it imposed in Docket Number 39147 based on the
same terms and conditions. 13 (R., pp.142-43, 259-64.) Of particular note, the district
court revoked all exceptions to the NCO, making it an absolute ban on contact between
Mr. Peterson and Ms. Giannini again. (R., pp.142-43, 263.)
Thereafter, Ms. Giannini went to Mr. Peterson's workplace, demanded to see
him, and informed him that she had been raped while he had been in prison.
(See, e.g., R., pp.186, 306.) Mr. Peterson was initially able to invoke the NCO and do
what he could to abide by the terms thereof. ( See, e.g., R., pp.186, 306.) However, as
he processed what Ms. Giannini had told him, he began to feel disgusted with himself
for not being able to support her as she had supported him. 14

( See,

e.g., R., pp.186,

306.) Ultimately, those emotions won out and he decided to provide that support by
rekindling their relationship. (See, e.g., R., pp.186, 306.) The State filed new charges
for violating the NCO over the ensuing communications between Mr. Peterson and
Ms. Giannini, which were documented in telephone records presented to the district
courts.

(See Tr., Vol.5, p.31, L.13 - p.32, L.14; Tr., Vol.1, p.103, L.25 - p.104, L.4.)

That new charge also served as the basis for a new report of probation violation.
(R., pp.171-74, 291-94.) The new charges (Docket Number 39783) were assigned to a
different district court judge than the one presiding over Docket Numbers 39146 and
39147. (R., Vol.1, pp.30, 247; R., Vol.2, p.23.)

12

To that end, the prosecutor did not even object to Mr. Peterson's motion to reduce his
bond. (Tr., Vol.1, p.56, Ls.3-9.)
13
That sentence was for a unified five-year term, with three and one-half years fixed,
and was concurrent to Docket Number 39146. (R., Vol.1, p.259-64.)
14
Ms. Giannini, for example, had provided support for Mr. Peterson when he called her
for help regarding a relapse he experienced during his recovery. (See, e.g., Tr., Vol.2,
p.20, L.18 - p.21, L.5.)

8

In regard to the probation violations in Docket Numbers 39146 and 39147,

Mr. Peterson agreed to admit two of the allegations, and the State agreed to dismiss the
remainder.

(Tr., Vol.4, p.5, Ls.11-20; Tr. Vol.4, p.17, Ls., 12-25.) All terms were left

open for argument by both parties.

(Tr., Vol.4, p.5, Ls.20-22.)

At the disposition

hearing, Mr. Peterson pointed out that the PSI focused on the uncharged malicious
injury to property allegation rather than the violations of the NCO. 15

(Tr., Vol.1, p.109,

Ls.7-17.) Defense counsel also pointed out that Ms. Giannini was a willing participant (if
not the instigator) of these contacts.

(Tr., Vol.1, p.110, Ls.16-19.)

Defense counsel

also recommended that, based on the evolution of Mr. Peterson's mental health
conditions, and the impact they played on his continuing behavior, the district court
consider recommending him to the mental health diversion court to try and provide
additional help, support, and treatment options to continue his rehabilitation.
Tr., Vol.1, p.115, Ls.5-24.)

(See

As an alternative, defense counsel recommended a new

period of retained jurisdiction with a recommendation for the Therapeutic Community
rider program. (Tr., Vol.1, p.116, Ls.10-18.) However, the district court pointed out that
Mr. Peterson has had several prior opportunities to conform to the terms of probation,

15

There was a report that a truck belonging to Ms. Shanta DeVilliers had been parked
near Ms. Giannini's home in December 2010 and that it had been vandalized while
there. (See, e.g., PSI, Vol.2, p.4.) The motion for probation violation filed on March 16,
2011, in Docket Numbers 39146 and 39147 included a report that Mr. Peterson had
committed the crime of malicious injury to property, and so had violated his probation.
(R., Vol.1, p.292.) However, that allegation was never mentioned in the complaint or
the information in Docket Number 39783. (See generally, R., Vol.2, pp.5-6, 26-27.)
Furthermore, when Mr. Peterson agreed to admit two of the allegations (neither of which
was the allegation regarding the malicious injury to property) the State agreed to
dismiss the remaining allegations. (Tr., Vol.4, p.5, Ls.10-20; p.16, L 18 - p.17, L.25;
see also R., Vol.1, p.292.) In response to Mr. Peterson's concern, the district court
confirmed that Mr. Peterson had not actually been charged with malicious injury to
property. (Tr., Vol.5, p.31, Ls.10-14.)
9

and so it executed the two sentences. 16 (Tr., Vol.1, p.125, Ls.6-23.) It did recommend
that Mr. Peterson be considered for both the Therapeutic Community program in the
prison, as well as the mental health unit.

(Tr., Vol.1, p.125, L.22, p.126, Ls.19-21;

R., Vol.1, pp.195-97, 316-18.)

Mr. Peterson appealed timely from the decision to revoke his probation.
(R., Vol.1,

pp.200-02, 321-23.)

He also contemporaneously filed motions for

reconsideration of his sentences pursuant to Rule 35.

(R., Vol.1, pp.199, 320.)

He

filed a brief in support of that motion, to which various documents demonstrating
completion of programming were attached. (R., Vol.1, pp.206-14, 327-35.) However,
the district court stated that, since Mr. Peterson had been unable to succeed on
probation in the past, he was unlikely to be able to succeed in the future, and thus, the
need of society to protect itself from further violations of the NCO outweighed his
unconvincing evidence of his rehabilitative potential.

(R., Vol.1, pp.217-18, 338-39.)

Accordingly, it denied his motions. (R., Vol.1, pp.215-18, 336-39.)
As to the new charges in Docket Number 39783, Mr. Peterson agreed to plead
guilty as charged and the State agreed to not file a persistent violator enhancement
and to cap its recommendation at a unified five-year sentence, with four years fixed,
concurrent with the other sentences. (Tr., Vol.5, p.1, Ls.8-15, p.7, Ls.1-15; see also
Tr., Vol.5, p.28, Ls.2-9 (the district court reiterating the plea agreement on the record,
indicating the recommendation was that this sentence be concurrent to both of the other
sentences, a statement which drew no objection from either party).) Mr. Peterson also

16

The district court did give him credit for time served - on Docket Number 39146
(three years fixed, five total), it granted credit for nearly two years of time served
(R., Vol.1, pp.195-96), and on Docket Number 39147 (three and one-half years fixed,
five total), it granted credit for nearly one year of time served. (R., Vol.1, p.317.)
10

made some statements to the district court at that time. He confirmed that he rekindled
his relationship with Ms. Giannini so as to be able to provide her with support, becoming
so emotional in regard to these events that the district court was obliged to take a
recess so that he could collect himself

(Tr., Vol.5, p.22, L.14 - p.23, L.14, p.24,

Ls.1-23.) He also informed the district court that the prison staff was not permitting him
to take the anti-seizure medication prescribed by Dr. Gage. (Tr., Vol.5, p.4, Ls.7-12,
p.5, Ls.2-9.)
At the sentencing hearing in that case, Mr. Peterson articulated his concern that
the PSI had focused on an allegation of malicious injury to property, a crime for which
there is no evidence that he had ever been charged, much less convicted, as well as
the apparent lack of evidence regarding the records of his telephonic communications
with Ms. Giannini. (Tr., Vol.5, p.31, Ls.4-12.) The district court reassured Mr. Peterson
that it would not be considering the malicious injury allegation as it had not been
charged against him, and that it had received the relevant telephone records with the
PSI and had reviewed those records. (Tr., Vol.5, p.31, L.13 - p.32, L.14.) Mr. Peterson
indicated that he was satisfied with that reassurance. (Tr., p.32, Ls.15-16.)
Defense counsel also pointed out that Ms. Giannini, not Mr. Peterson, was
usually the instigating party in this as well as the prior incidents, and that apart from
Ms. Giannini's interference, Mr. Peterson actually presents as a likely candidate for
rehabilitation otherwise.

(Tr., Vol.5, p.37, L.14 -

p.39, L.3.)

As a result, he

recommended that the sentence be a unified five-year sentence, but with only one year
fixed, and that it be concurrent to the other two sentences. (Tr., Vol.5, p.39, Ls.4-7.)
Mr. Peterson recounted these facts and requested that, if the district court did not

11

accept his attorney's recommendation, that it not impose a fixed term beyond two and
one-half years. 17 (Tr., Vol.5, p.41, Ls.19-25.)
The district court, however, pointed to the "disturbing pattern of violating these
court orders," as an aggravating factor which it was considering.
Ls.9-10.)

(Tr., Vol.5, p.44,

It then recounted the various mitigating factors in Mr. Peterson's case,

dwelling particularly on Ms. Giannini's complicity in the contacts and the fact that the
contacts were not "bad" or otherwise unwelcome. (Tr., Vol.5, p.44, L.19 - p.45, L.23.)
In that regard, it reviewed a multitude of telephone records:
Those phone records show that between June of 2010 and January
of 2011, they were able to document some 1,386 phone calls from you to
the victim in violation of your no contact order.
Those phone records also indicated that on that same date -between those same dates, they were able to document 1,899 text
messages between you and the victim of the no contact order. Those
materials are within the presentence materials that I've reviewed, sir. 18
(Tr., Vol.5, p.32, Ls.6-14.)

As a result of the district court's consideration of that

evidence, it imposed a unified sentence of five years, with only one and one-half years
fixed, but it did impose that sentence consecutive to the other two sentences.
(R., Vol.2, pp.56; Tr., p.46, Ls.14-20.)

Mr. Peterson attempted to appeal against that new sentence, but that appeal was
dismissed as untimely. (See Docket Number 39679.) He did, however, file a timely

17

Calculating in the ordered credit for time served, that is approximately the same
amount of time that remained in the fixed portions of his other two sentences. (See,
R., Vol.1, pp.195-96, 317.)
18
As those telephone records were attached to the PSI information presented to the
district court in Docket Number 39783 (Tr., Vol.5, p. p.32, Ls.13-14), they would have
also been provided to the district court in Docket Numbers 39146 and 39147 because,
as that district court stated, "I also have ... the updated presentence report prepared
for [Docket Number 39783] and the attached materials related to those presentence
materials." {Tr., Vol.1, p.103, L.25 - p.104, L.4.) As such, both district court records
should have included a copy of those documents.
12

Rule 35 motion requesting leniency in that case.

(R., Vol.2, p.60.)

He filed an

addendum to which he attached a letter written by him, requesting the district court at
least make his sentence in Docket Number 39783 concurrent to the other two
sentences in recognition of the mutuality of the contacts.

(R., Vol.2, pp.63-64.)

Otherwise he requested his sentence be reduced to a unified term of five years with
zero fixed. 19 (R., Vol.2, pp.63-64.) The district court denied that motion, holding that
the evidence of Mr. Peterson's programming efforts and positive performance in prison
did not justify a more lenient sentence in light of his history of disregard for the NCO,
nor did the district court find it illustrative of how Mr. Peterson would perform in a
non-custodial setting. (R., Vol.2, pp.71-72.) Mr. Peterson filed a timely notice of appeal
from the denial of his Rule 35 motion in that case. (R., pp.74-76.)
Thereafter, he moved that these three cases be consolidated due to the fact that
they all shared the same core facts and would raise similar issues on appeal. (Motion
to Consolidate, filed July 5, 2012.)

The Idaho Supreme Court granted that order.

(Order Granting Motion to Consolidate, filed July 11, 2012.) However, the telephone
records reviewed by the district court (see Tr., Vol.5, p.32, Ls.6-14) were not included
with any of the PSI materials provided with the appellate record. (See generally PSI,
Vol.1; PSI, Vol.2)

Mr. Peterson filed a Motion to Augment the record with those

documents. (Motion to Augment and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule and Statement
in Support Thereof (hereinafter, Motion to Augment Telephone Records), filed July 5,
2012, pp.1-2.) The Idaho Supreme Court ultimately denied that motion because "this
Court has been advised by the district court that there are no records of the defendant's

19

He and his attorney recommended at sentencing that the fixed term should be one
year, but should not exceed two and one-half years. (Tr., Vol.5, p.39, Ls.4-7, p.41,
Ls.19-25.)
13

telephone and texting communications." (Order Denying Motion to Augment and To
Suspend the Briefing Schedule (hereinafter, Order Denying Telephone Records, filed
July 23, 2012.) Mr. Peterson was given thirty-five days from that date to file his brief.
(Order Denying Telephone Records.)
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ISSUES
1. Whether the district court violated Mr. Peterson's state and federal constitutional
rights to due process by failing to maintain an accurate copy of the record in his
case.
2. Whether the district court abused its discretion by revoking Mr. Peterson's
probation in Docket Numbers 39146 and 39147, or, by not reducing his
sentences sua sponte pursuant to Rule 35.
3. Whether either or both of the district courts abused their discretion when they
denied Mr. Peterson's Rule 35 motions.

15

ARGUMEI\JT
I.
The District Court Violated Mr. Peterson's State And Federal Constitutional Rights To
Due Process By Failing To Maintain An Accurate Copy Of The Record In His Case

A.

Introduction
Both the Idaho and federal constitutions guarantees the defendant in a criminal

case due process of law. Part of that due process right is to be afforded access to an
adequate record on appeal. All the information upon which the district court relied in
making the decision challenged on appeal needs to be included in the appellate record,
otherwise the appellate record is inadequate.
telephone records upon which

By not maintaining a copy of the

it expressly relied,

the district courts deprived

Mr. Peterson of his due process protections to an adequate appellate record. Such a
deprivation necessitates a remedy on appeal, specifically a new sentencing and
disposition hearing before a new judge. This Court should afford that remedy.

B.

By Not Preserving A Sufficient Record For Appeal, The District Court Violated
Mr. Peterson's Due Process Rights
Both the state and federal constitutions guarantee a criminal defendant due

process and equal protection of law. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; IDAHO CONST. art. I § 13.
One aspect of those protections is that the defendant has a right to "'a record on appeal
that is sufficient for adequate appellate review of the errors alleged regarding the
proceedings below."'

State v. Morgan, _ _ P.3d _ _ , Docket No. 39057, at 2

(Ct. App. 2012) (quoting State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 462 (2002)), petition for rev.

filed.

It is untenable for the courts to deprive a defendant-appellant from receiving an

adequate appellate

review by depriving
16

him

of a sufficient appellate

record.

Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487, 498 (1963); see Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19

(1956).
This is particularly important because of the presumption established in Idaho
regarding missing portions of the record: "[AJn appellant bears the burden to provide an
adequate record upon which the appellate court can review the merits of the claims of
error ... and where pertinent portions of the record are missing on appeal, they are
presumed to support the actions of the trial court." State v. Coma, 133 Idaho 29, 34
(Ct. App. 1999) (citation omitted). Mr. Peterson has taken all reasonable steps to meet
this obligation, yet, due to circumstances entirely beyond his control, relevant portions of
the record are unavailable to him, specifically, information which was used as an
aggravating factor. Thus, the record is insufficient.
Notably, the Idaho Supreme Court has indicated that the culpability lies with the
district court: "this Court has been advised by the district court that there are no records
of the defendant's telephone and texting communications." 20

(Order Denying

Telephone Records.) The ultimate conclusion is that, due to the district courts' failure to
preserve copies of the documents attached to the PSI, Mr. Peterson was denied access
to a sufficient appellate record in contravention of his state and federal appellate rights.
See, e.g., Morgan, Docket Number 39057, at p.2.

As the error is clear based on the record that was provided, the next question
regards the appropriate remedy.

The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, where a

sufficient record is unavailable, "but had a record been available it might have
substantiated the defendant's allegation that there was prejudicial error in those

20

Since the district courts obviously had those records, the fact that they do not exist
must be attributed to the district courts. ( See Tr., Vol.1, p.103, L.25 - p.104, L.4;
Tr., Vol.5, p.32, Ls.6-14.)
17

proceedings," the judgment of conviction based on the missing portions of the record
cannot stand. State v. Walters, 120 Idaho 46, 51 (1990) (emphasis added). This is
particularly true when the insufficiency is due to factors beyond the defendant's control.

See State v. Martinez, 92 Idaho 148, 149-50 (1968).
For example, where a juvenile defendant was deprived of an adequate appellate
record due to the district court's failure to make or preserve either the recording or
minutes of a hearing, the Idaho Supreme Court ordered: "The judgment is reversed and
the cause remanded with directions to the trial court to enter an order directing the
warden of the State Penitentiary to release and discharge appellant, unless the
prosecuting attorney of Jefferson County obtains a bench warrant for the further
prosecution of appellant prior to remittitur herein." Ebersole v. State, 91 Idaho 630, 636
(1967). The Court found that this remedy was appropriate since the error was not of the
defendant's making and the district court had failed to comply with the relevant statute.
Id. In doing so, the district court had deprived the defendant of the fundamental fairness

necessary to state and federal due process. 21 Id.
Essentially, when the defendant is deprived of the opportunity to establish the
facts of his case as he challenges the legality of the decision to incarcerate him,
particularly when the deprivation is due to no fault of his, the deprivation of the due
process rights is clear. Martinez, 92 Idaho at 149-50. This principle has been extended
to situations where an affidavit in support of a search warrant is not included in the
record.

See State v. Zielinski, 119 Idaho 316, 318 (1991).

In that case, the Idaho

Supreme Court held that at a subsequent "reconstruction hearing," the trial court could

21

However, not every failure in that regard constituted a deprivation of due process.
See, e.g., State v. Wright, 97 Idaho 229, 231 (1975).
18

not rely on that affidavit, the warrant was invalid, and thus, it upheld the dismissal of the
complaint. Id.
Therefore, in this case, where Mr. Peterson pied guilty to the offenses, the
conviction itself does not appear to be problematically-based on the missing documents.
Compare Walters, 120 Idaho at 51; Zielinski, 119 Idaho at 318. Nevertheless, there has

been a violation of his due process rights, and so he should be afforded a remedy.
See Martinez, 92 Idaho at 149-50. Therefore, based on the rule set forth in Ebersole,

Mr. Peterson requests an order for his release unless the State pursues a new
sentencing hearing and a new disposition hearing before a different judge, wherein the
evidence relied upon to justify the resulting sentencing determination is preserved for
appellate review. See Ebersole, 91 Idaho at 636.

11.
The District Court In Docket Numbers 39146 And 39147 Abused Its Discretion By
Revoking Mr. Peterson's Probation, Or, By I\Jot Reducing His Sentences Sua Sponte
Pursuant To Rule 35
A.

Introduction
Mr. Peterson contends that, in Docket Numbers 39146 and 39147, the district

court abused its discretion when it revoked his probation, or alternatively, when it failed
to reduce his sentences sua sponte pursuant to Rule 35 when it did so. He alleges that
the abuse occurred because the district court did not sufficiently consider the mitigating
factors in this case, notably, the fact that Ms. Giannini was either a willing participant or
the instigator of the contacts, and that he had been able to perform satisfactorily in all
other regards of his probation. As such, he contends that the district court could not
reasonably conclude that probation was inappropriate in this case.

19

As a result, its

decision to revoke probation and order his incarceration constituted an abuse of
discretion.

B.

The District Court In Docket Nos. 39146 And 39147 Abused Its Discretion When
It Revoked Mr. Peterson's Probation
Mr. Peterson asserts that, given any view of the facts, the decision to revoke

probation and execute his concurrent unified sentences of five years, with three years
fixed, and five years with three and one-half years fixed, was an abuse of the district
court's discretion.
discretion.

The decision to revoke probation is within the district court's

State v. Chavez, 134 Idaho 308, 312 (Ct. App. 2000). The district court

must determine "whether the probation is achieving the goal of rehabilitation and
whether continuation of the probation is consistent with the protection of society." Id.
The Legislature has established the criteria for determining whether probation or
incarceration is merited. State v. Merwin, 131 Idaho 642, 648 (1998) (citing I.C. § 192521 ). In reviewing such a decision, the Court of Appeals uses a multi-tiered inquiry,
determining "(1) whether the lower court correctly perceived the issue as one of
discretion; (2) whether the lower court acted within the boundaries of such discretion
and consistent with any legal standards applicable to the specific choice before it; and
(3) whether the lower court reached its decision by an exercise of reason." Chavez, 134
Idaho at 312-13 (citing State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600 (1989)). Accordingly, in
order to show an abuse of discretion, Mr. Peterson must show that, in light of the
governing criteria, the sentence was excessive considering any view of the facts. See

id. at 312.
In order to satisfy this standard, the district court needed to sufficiently
consider the recognized sentencing objectives in light of the mitigating factors in the
20

record. See, e.g., State v. Charboneau, 124 Idaho 497, 500 (1993). Those sentencing
objectives are: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public
generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for
wrongdoing. State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997). The protection of society is
the primary objective the court should consider.

Charboneau, 124 Idaho at 500.

Therefore, a sentence that protects society and also accomplishes the other objectives
will be considered reasonable.

Id.; State v. Toohi/1, 103 Idaho 568 (Ct. App. 1982).

This is because the protection of society is influenced by each of the other objectives,
and as a result, each must be addressed in sentencing. Charboneau, 124 Idaho at 500.
There are several factors that a court should consider to determine whether
protection of society and rehabilitation (along with deterrence and retribution) are served
by a particular disposition. See State v. Knighton, 143 Idaho 318, 320 (2006). They
include, but are not limited to: "the defendant's good character, status as a first-time
offender, sincere expressions of remorse and amenability to treatment, and support of
family." Id. Insufficient consideration of these factors has been the basis for a more
lenient sentence in several cases.

See, e.g., Cook v. State, 145 Idaho 482, 489-90

(Ct. App. 2008); State v. Alberts, 121 Idaho 204,209 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. Carrasco,
114 Idaho 348, 354-55 (Ct. App. 1988), rev'd on other grounds, 117 Idaho 295, 301
(1990); State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 595 (1982).

In this case, several of those

factors are present, but were insufficiently considered by the district court as it crafted
its disposition in regard to Mr. Peterson. As a result, it did not sufficiently consider
whether Mr. Peterson's probation was adequately serving the goal of rehabilitation or
whether society

required

protection

from

21

Mr.

Peterson

through

incarceration.

See Chavez, 134 Idaho at 312.

Therefore, this disposition constitutes an abuse of

discretion.
First, the Idaho Supreme Court has also recently recognized that I.C. § 19-2523
requires the trial court to consider a defendant's mental health condition as a sentencing
factor. Hollon v. State, 132 Idaho 573, 581 (1999). The record is replete with evidence
of Mr. Peterson's mental health issues and their effect on him. (See, e.g., PSI, Vol.1,
pp.339, 448-57.) These issues played a major role in Mr. Peterson's decisions after
Ms. Giannini reinitiated contact.

(See, e.g., PSI, Vol.2, p.18; R., pp.186, 306

(recounting his reaction to and rationalization regarding Ms. Giannini's statements).)
Since those conditions had a major effect on his reaction to her reinitiation of their
relationship, his mental conditions needed to be sufficiently considered, and failing to do
so constitutes an abuse of discretion.
Additionally, acknowledgment of guilt and thus, acceptance of responsibility, by
the defendant are critical first steps toward rehabilitation. See State v. Kellis, 148 Idaho
812, 815 (Ct. App. 2010).

Mr. Peterson continues to recognize and accept his

responsibility in regard to his actions. (See, e.g., PSI, Vol. 1, p.31 O; PSI, Vol.2, p.129;
Tr., Vol.1, p.78, L.24; Tr., Vol.5, p.39, Ls.13-15, p.41, Ls.15-18) He has also expressed
his sincere remorse for his failures in this regard. (See, e.g., Tr. Vol.1, p.18, Ls.19-24.)
These two acknowledgements by Mr. Peterson demonstrate that he has taken these
critical first steps, and as such, those first steps needed to be sufficiently considered by
the district court.

22

In addition, Ms. Giannini's behavior should not be overlooked. 22

She was

the party who reinitiated contact by threatening to make a scene at Mr. Peterson's
workplace.

(See, e.g., R., pp.186, 306.)

Mr. Peterson was able to respond

appropriately, reminding her of the NCO and ending the contact. (See, e.g., R., pp.186,
306.) That demonstrates an ability to adhere to the terms of probation if given a little
more power (for example, by making the NCO mutual). In addition, that is a factor the
Legislature has identified as indicating imprisonment is an improper result.

I.C. § 19-

2521 {2)(c)-(e) (providing that where the victim induced or facilitated the crime, or that
where the defendant acted under provocation or had some other imperfect defense to
the crime, those factors should be considered as weighing against the need to
incarcerate that defendant). In addition, Ms. Giannini was a willing participant and was
not afraid of Mr. Peterson during that time. (See, e.g., Tr., Vol.1, p.110, Ls.18-19; PSI,
Vol.2, p.18 {Ms. Giannini explaining to officers that she did not call the authorities during
the initial contacts, even though there was the NCO, suggesting that she was not afraid
during that time, despite the contacts).) And because Mr. Peterson's actions did not
contemplate or cause harm, those are two more reasons the Legislature has said that
incarceration is an inappropriate result. I.C. § 19-2521 (2)(a)-(b).

22

In fact, Ms. Giannini has demonstrated her desire to have control over Mr. Peterson.
When she was asked by officers about the vandalism to Ms. DeVilliers's truck (see
footnote 14, supra), she told them that Mr. Peterson was jealously possessive of her
and that he was causing problems for her. (See, e.g., PSI, Vol.2, p.18.) She revealed
that there was a no contact order and accused him of breaking it (without informing the
officers that it was she who had reinitiated the contact). (See, e.g., PSI, Vol.2, p.18.)
Ultimately, she told police that she believed Mr. Peterson had vandalized the vehicle
without any basis for that assumption other than the fact that police were asking about
him in possible connection to the event. (See, e.g., PSI, Vol.2, p.19.) Yet she went on
to recant that statement, and in doing so, was able to portray herself as Mr. Peterson's
ally. (See, e.g.l PSI, Vol.2, p.29.) As defense counsel summarized, it appears that "she
did try to put him in a position where he would violate the no-contact order. ... there is
some mitigation here." {Tr., p.111, Ls.1-5.)
23

In addition, Mr. Peterson has been able to perform well in the other aspects of his
probation.

And, he has the ongoing support of his family, friends, and employers.

(See PSI, Vol.2, pp.428-29, 432, 481, 483, 534.)

The most telling evidence of this

strong support network was revealed by the ALJ, who noted that Mr. Peterson's
employer was understanding of his condition, and as such, gave Mr. Peterson a lot of
leeway in the workplace. (See, e.g., PSI, Vol.1, p.347.) In fact, his employer is willing
to continue employing Mr. Peterson when he is ultimately released.

(See, e.g., PSI,

Vol.1, p.9.) This demonstrates a commitment by members of his community to help
IVlr. Peterson succeed. A strong support network is a factor that should be considered
in terms of rehabilitation.

See Ke//is, 148 Idaho 812 (holding that familial support

offered to affirm the defendant's innocence does not equate to familial support offered in
consideration of rehabilitation, implying that had the support been offered for
rehabilitation, it would be a mitigating factor worthy of consideration).
A sufficient examination of all these factors reveals that a suspended sentence,
which provides for continued rehabilitation, still addresses all the other objectives protection of society, punishment, and deterrence.

See State v. Ransom, 124 Idaho

703, 713 (1993) (requiring that alternative sentences still address all the sentencing
objectives). When a sentencing court suspends a sentence and orders probation, it still
imposes a sentence.

Therefore, both the retributive and the deterrent effects of the

imposed sentence are still present.

See State v. Crockett, 146 Idaho 13, 14-15

(Ct. App. 2008) (discussing how a sentence for a period of probation addresses all the
sentencing objectives and how the court's continuing jurisdiction affects those
objectives). Furthermore, the district court retains the ability to revoke the probation and
execute the original sentence if Mr. Peterson were to fail to continue his rehabilitative
24

efforts probation.

However, it could do so knowing that all the sentencing objectives

would be properly addressed.

What the probationary period provides that a term

sentence does not is the opportunity to rehabilitate in a real-world setting, allowing
Mr. Peterson to apply the lessons he would gain in out-patient treatment in a practical
setting.

C.

Alternatively, The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Failed To Sua
Sponte Reduce Mr. Peterson's Sentences Pursuant To Rule 35
Even if the district court still properly determined that incarceration was

necessary, it should have reduced Mr. Peterson's sentences sua sponte pursuant to
Rule 35. See, e.g., State v. Timbana, 145 Idaho 779, 782 (2008). The decision to not
reduce a previously-pronounced sentence will be reversed on appeal if it constitutes an
abuse of the district court's discretion. State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 27 (Ct. App.
2009); abrogated on other grounds by State v. Morgan,
39057 (Ct App. 2012), petition for rev. filed.

P. 3d _ , Docket No.

The standard of review and factors

considered in such a decision are the same as those used for the initial sentencing.

Id. (citing among others, Toohi/1, 103 Idaho at 568). Therefore, the district court needed
to sufficiently consider the recognized sentencing objectives in light of the mitigating
factors in the record. See id.; Charboneau, 124 Idaho at 500. A failure to do so should
result in a more lenient sentence. See, e.g., Cook, 145 Idaho at 489-90; Shideler, 103
Idaho at 595.
Therefore, for the reasons articulated in Section ll(B) supra, the district court
should have at least reduced the sentences in order to allow Mr. Peterson the
opportunity to more quickly return to his support network where he would be able to
continue rehabilitating and contributing to society.
25

111.

Either Or Both Of The District Courts Abused Their Discretion When They Denied
Mr. Peterson's Rule 35 Motions

A

Introduction
All three of Mr. Peterson's Rule 35 motions made essentially the same request

for leniency based on his contention that the sentences imposed are excessive.
Furthermore, both district courts gave essentially the same reason for their denials of
those motions: Mr. Peterson had been given several opportunities at probation and had
continued to violate the terms thereof. However, the new information provided to the
district courts demonstrate that he had been fairly successful in adhering to all the other
terms of his probation, which, when combined with a sufficient consideration of all the
factors, reveals that he is still a good candidate for probation.

As such the district

courts' decisions to deny the Rule 35 motions were abuses of discretion.

B.

The District Court in Docket Nos. 39146 and 39147 Abused Its Discretion By
Denying Mr. Peterson's Rule 35 Motions
A motion to alter an otherwise lawful sentence pursuant to Rule 35 is addressed

to the sound discretion of tl1e sentencing court, and is essentially a plea for leniency
which may be granted if the sentence originally imposed was unduly severe.
State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203 (2007).

When petitioning for a sentence

reduction pursuant to Rule 35, the defendant must show his sentence is excessive in
light of new or additional information presented to the sentencing court. Id. 'The criteria
for examining rulings denying the requested leniency are the same as those applied in
determining whether the original sentence was reasonable." State v. Trent, 125 Idaho
251, 253 (Ct. App. 1994). Therefore, the district court needed to sufficiently consider
26

the recognized sentencing objectives in light of the mitigating factors as they were
altered by the new evidence Mr. Peterson presented. See id.; Huffman, 144 Idaho at
203. A failure to do so should result in a more lenient sentence. See e.g., Cook, 145
Idaho at 489-90; Alberts, 121 Idaho at 209; Carrasco, 114 Idaho at 354-55; Shideler,
103 Idaho at 595.
Mr. Peterson presented the district court with documentation of his ability to
succeed in rehabilitative programming and be a productive member of his community.
(See R., Vol.1, pp.331-35.) Because that was the case, and because any additional

treatment necessary could be obtained through the Therapeutic Community rider
program (see, e.g., R., Vol.1, p.328), the decision to deny the Rule 35 motion forces the
prison system to continue detaining Mr. Peterson, when better treatment options were
available without incarceration, which runs contrary to yet another of the Legislature's
recommendations. See I.C. § 19-2521 (1 )(b). Furthermore, sentences are to be crafted
so that they do not force the prison system to continue detaining a person once
rehabilitation or age has decreased the risk of recidivism.

Cook, 145 Idaho at 489;

State v. Eubank, 114 Idaho 635, 639 (Ct. App. 1988). By foregoing that rehabilitative

opportunity, the decision to deny the Rule 35 motion operates contrary to the
admonitions from Cook and Eubank.

The fact that Mr. Peterson had previous

opportunities for probation alone does not mean that continued probation, or a period of
retained jurisdiction, is still not the best option to promote rehabilitation (and as a result,
long-term protection of society). See Me,win, 131 Idaho at 648 (identifying I.C. § 192521 as the proper standard for determining whether probation is appropriate in a given
case); I.C. § 19-2521 (not establishing that the fact that a defendant has had prior
rehabilitative opportunities should be a factor indicating incarceration is appropriate).
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As such, the district court's articulated reason for denying the Rule 35 motion is
insufficient to justify its decision.

(See R., Vol.1, pp.338-39.)

In fact, as described

supra, many of the factors identified by the Legislature actually indicate that

Mr. Peterson should have remained on probation. See I.C. § 19-2521 (2)(a)-(e).
Therefore, this new evidence, in addition to the insu'fficiently-considered
mitigating factors discussed in Section ll(B)-(C), supra, demonstrates that the district
court's decision to deny Mr. Peterson's Rule 35 motions constituted an abuse of
discretion. See, e.g., Cook, 145 Idaho at 489-90; Shideler, 103 Idaho at 595.

C.

The District Court in Docket No. 39783 Abused Its Discretion By Denying
Mr. Peterson's Rule 35 Motion
The district court in this case denied the Rule 35 motion for reasons similar to

those articulated by the district court in Docket Nos. 39146 and 39147.
pp.69-72; compare R., Vol.1, pp.215-18; 336-39.)
those discussed in Section

11 l(B),

(R., Vol.2,

Therefore, for reasons similar to

supra, its decision also constituted an abuse of

discretion.
However, it also concluded that the new evidence Mr. Peterson presented
(namely, ~1is successful efforts to program since being incarcerated) were not indicative
of how he would perform in a less-structured and less-supervised setting. (R., Vol.2,
p.72.)

In reaching that conclusion, it essentially ignored the other evidence in the

record, which indicated that the performance in prison was not an aberration, and that
would continue

such

behavior in the less-supervised setting.

For example,

Mr. Peterson was able to maintain a clean and sober residence, maintain employment
(despite being fully disabled), and maintain his programming. (PSI, Vol.2, p.107.) As
such, the district court failed to sufficiently consider the new evidence in light of all the
28

other evidence from the prior instances, and as such, abused its discretion. See, e.g.,
Hanington, 148 Idaho at 27.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Peterson respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it
deems appropriate. Alternatively, he requests that his case be remanded to the district
court for a new sentencing hearing.
DATED this 2th day of August, 2012.

BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

29

CERTIFICATE OF MAILII\JG
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 2yth day of August, 2012, I served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF, by causing to be placed a copy
thereof in the U.S. Mail, addressed to:
THOMAS EDWARD PETERSON
INMATE #68476
SICI
PO BOX 8509
BOISE ID 83707
MICHAEL E WETHERELL
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
E-MAILED BRIEF
PATRICK HOWEN
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
E-MAILED BRIEF
ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER'S OFFICE
200 W FRONT ST
BOISE ID 83702
STATEHOUSE MAIL
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
CRIMINAL DIVISION
PO BOX 83720
BOISE ID 83720-0010
Hand delivered to Attorney General's mailbox at Supreme Court.

Administrative Assistant
BRD/eas

30

